This chapter provides a historical account of the transformation of pregnancy through philosophical theory and legal practice. What has remained seemingly consistent across history, though, is the lack of rights a pregnant woman can enjoy. Whilst it may manifest differently across time and place, unfortunately misogynistic attitudes persist, and this is reflected in the continual degrading of the gestator (and gestation), which is reinforced by certain philosophical theorising and technological advancement. We thus urge caution in making philosophical claims about the (...) epistemic transformation in pregnancy, given the epistemic (and other) injustices already faced by pregnant people. We recognise that there are transformations that occur because of pregnancy, but we argue that there ought not be with respect to the pregnant person's autonomy, agency, and control over their bodies. Through an analysis of legal cases, we can see that the practice falls out of line with the theory regarding how pregnant people are treated. But perhaps it is both the theory and the practice that need to change so as to bring them in line. How we theorise about pregnancy is intertwined with our cultural views, our technological advancements, and our medical and legal practices, requiring multi-disciplinary study for a more holistic overview. In this chapter, we contribute to this endeavour by bringing some such strands together, regarding the transformation that pregnancy is, that pregnancy makes, and that pregnancy has had historically, in philosophy, and in legal practice. (shrink)

A 2017 Nature report was widely touted as hailing the arrival of the artificial womb. But the scientists involved claim their technology is merely an improvement in neonatal care. This raises an under-considered question: what differentiates neonatal incubation from artificial womb technology? Considering the nature of gestation—or metaphysics of pregnancy—(a) identifies more profound differences between fetuses and neonates/babies than their location (in or outside the maternal body) alone: fetuses and neonates have different physiological and physical characteristics; (b) characterizes birth as (...) a physiological, mereological and topological transformation as well as a (morally relevant) change of location; and (c) delivers a clear distinction between neonatal incubation and ectogestation: the former supports neonatal physiology; the latter preserves fetal physiology. This allows a detailed conceptual classification of ectogenetive and ectogestative technologies according to which the 2017 system is not just improved neonatal incubation, but genuine ectogestation. But it is not an artificial womb, which is a term that is better put to rest. The analysis reveals that any ethical discussion involving ectogestation must always involve considerations of possible risks to the mother as well as her autonomy and rights. It also adds a third and potentially important dimension to debates in reproductive ethics: the physiological transition from fetus/gestateling to baby/neonate. (shrink)

Misconduct in science is often viewed and analyzed through the lenses of normative ethics and moral philosophy. However, notions and methods in the philosophy of science could also provide rather penetrative explanatory insights into the nature and causes of scientific misconduct. A brief illustration in this regard, using as examples the widely popular Popperian falsification and the Kuhnian scientific paradigm, is provided. In multiple areas of scientific research, failure to seek falsification in a Popperian manner constitutes a questionable research practice (...) and could lead to “falsification” in the context of research misconduct. On the other hand, scientific misconduct is often facilitated by its perpetrators using the familiarity, expectations and confines of a Kuhnian paradigm to blend in fabricated data/results. A rudimentary application of these philosophical notions could be useful in our understanding of the nature and cause of research misconduct, and facilitate mitigation of the latter through educational means. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the damage the Adoption Problem (...) causes for anti-exceptionalism, and show that it is also problematic for exceptionalist positions too. My diagnosis of why the Adoption Problem affects both positions is that the self-governance of basic logical rules of inference prevents them from being adoptable, regardless of whether logic is exceptional or not. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis (...) of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system. (shrink)

What is it for an imprecise credence to be justified? It might be thought that this is not a particularly urgent question for friends of imprecise credences to answer. For one might think that its answer just depends on how a well-trodden issue in epistemology plays out—namely, that of which theory of doxastic justification, be it reliabilism, evidentialism, or some other theory, is correct. I’ll argue, however, that it’s difficult for reliabilists to accommodate imprecise credences, at least if we understand (...) such credences to be determinate first-order attitudes. If I’m right, reliabilists will have to reject imprecise credences, and friends of imprecise credences will have to reject reliabilism. Near the end of the paper, I’ll also consider whether reliabilism can accommodate indeterminate credences. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the role of collective memory in ethno-national projects. In addition, there has been an expansion of research utilising memory work and auto/biographical methods, which have been particularly effective in the writing of feminists of colour. The paper is prompted by a return to Avtar Brah's ‘The Scent of Memory’ that it uses as a starting point to explore the relationships between competing accounts of ‘private’ memories of racialisation that come from (...) mixed-race siblings growing up in a mainly white town. Drawing on interviews, the paper uses familial narratives and their individual telling, to show how sense is made of divergent experiences and memories of childhood and teenage in 1960s and 1970s Britain. The paper shows how narrative accounts are often negotiated through multiple senses, revealing them as both imagined and recalled, contested and negotiated. The paper considers the strengths and limitations of narrative analysis in understanding the relationship between individual and collective memories at both national and familial levels. It argues that the ways in which the social and personal memories are connected in the processes of subjectivation are unstable and opaque, and can only ever be partially known through the process of narrativisation. (shrink)

Scientific realism holds that the terms in our scientific theories refer and that we should believe in their existence. This presupposes a certain understanding of quantification, namely that it is ontologically committing, which I challenge in this paper. I argue that the ontological loading of the quantifiers is smuggled in through restricting the domains of quantification, without which it is clear to see that quantifiers are ontologically neutral. Once we remove domain restrictions, domains of quantification can include non-existent things, as (...) they do in scientific theorizing. Scientific realism would therefore require redefining without presupposing a view of ontologically committing quantification. (shrink)

Ectogenesis, or “artificial womb technology,” has been heralded by some, such as prominent feminist Shulamith Firestone, as a way to liberate women. In this chapter, we challenge this view by offering an alternative analysis of the technology as relying upon and perpetuating a problematic model of pregnancy which, rather than liberating women, serves to devalue them. We look to metaphysics as the abstract study of reality to elucidate how the entities in a pregnancy are related to one another. We consider (...) two models of the metaphysics of pregnancy: (1) the Parthood Model, whereby the fetus is a part of what/who gestates it; and (2) and the Fetal Container Model, whereby the gestator is a container for the fetus. We suggest that under the assumption of the Fetal Container Model, we are more likely to think that any container will suffice for gestation, even an artificial one. In contrast, under the assumption of the Parthood Model, we are less likely to treat the gestator as interchangeable or replaceable, given the parthood relationship between gestator and fetus. This chapter argues that ectogenesis is conceptually linked to the Fetal Container Model and advocates a more cautious approach in promoting ectogenesis as a tool for women’s liberation. (shrink)

Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an (...) ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest. (shrink)

As with most other areas of reproduction, surrogacy is highly regulated. But the legislation and policies on surrogacy are written in such ways that make large (and possibly mistaken) assumptions about the metaphysical relationship between the mother and the fetus – whether the fetus is a part of, or contained by, the mother. It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight these assumptions, and to demonstrate the impact that alternative metaphysical views can have on our conceptualization of surrogacy. With (...) that in mind, I recommend that our public policies on surrogacy be at least neutral or otherwise responsive to metaphysics rather than presupposing it, such that the regulation and legislation of surrogacy will be metaphysically informed. (shrink)

One of the central questions in the metaphysics of pregnancy is this: Is the foetus a part of the mother? In this paper I aim not to answer this question, but rather to raise methodological concerns regarding how to approach answering it. I will outline how various areas attempt to answer whether the foetus is a part of the mother so as to demonstrate the methodological problems that each faces. My positive suggestion will be to adopt a method of reflective (...) equilibrium. The aim of this is to ensure that pregnancy be included in the tribunal of experience that our theories are held up against such that our theories can accommodate what we say about pregnancy, whilst also ensuring that what we say about pregnancy be theoretically informed. That way, we rethink pregnancy in light of our theories as well as rethinking our theories in light of pregnancy. (shrink)

The vast majority of indigenous communities are among the world’s poorest and are unlikely to be engaged in a thriving, mutually beneficial partnership with an MNC. While there are increasing studies on CSR initiatives in base of the pyramid communities, few—if any—feature the self-initiated stakeholder transition of an impoverished community. This paper examines the factors that motivated the stakeholder transformation process of an indigenous community, from its position as a non-stakeholder, one lacking in power and legitimacy, to the status of (...) being a primary stakeholder of the firm. We applied a constructivist grounded theory approach to longitudinal data to arrive at the conceptual framework. The findings presented are drawn from an in-depth case study of the Maasai, an indigenous community from East Africa. The findings point to the existence of entrepreneurial alertness that is instrumental in propelling the indigenous community to evolve from one stakeholder category to the next. Our research aims to propose a possible foundation for how communities deep in poverty can coalesce themselves to make their social needs salient to multinational organizations. (shrink)

Peifeng Tang untersucht das Verhältnis von Eigentum und Staat im Rahmen von Kants Transzendentalphilosophie. Nach systematischen und begrifflichen Vorklärungen analysiert der Autor zunächst, wie Kant? unter der Annahme einer Abhängigkeit des Rechts von der Moral? rechtfertigt, dass die Möglichkeit des Eigentums mit Notwendigkeit vorausgesetzt werden muss. Anschließend wird dargestellt, wie Kant das Problem des wirklichen Erwerbs des Eigentums transzendentalphilosophisch behandelt und von hier aus Entstehungsgrund, Aufgaben und Befugnisse des Staates in Bezug auf das Eigentum konzipiert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass (...) nicht erst dem Sozialstaat, sondern bereits dem kantischen Rechtsstaat eine Befugnis zur Eigentumsbeschränkung zukommt; sie darf aber nicht willkürlich, sondern nur streng demokratisch und zweckgebunden ausgeübt werden. Schließlich wird Kants Rousseau-Rezeption erläutert. Dadurch kommt die Arbeit zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Themenkomplex nicht nur eine rechts-, sondern auch eine geschichtsphilosophische Dimension hat. Unter letzterem Aspekt würde die Ausbreitung des Privateigentums nicht unbedingt zu Unfrieden führen, vielmehr könnte sie sogar einen Beitrag zur Rechtsverbesserung und zur Menschheitsentwicklung leisten. (shrink)

从生存语义入手来检讨人类美学的历史性迷雾,将美与人类生存发展及其行为意义联系起来进行整体考察,揭示美的产生与人类的诞生、审美创造与人类生存发展间的本质关系—其立意与视野,既新颖,又具有前所未有性。.

本书力图探讨利益的人类生命本质和社会本质,制定出更符合人类目标的利益伦理价值导向系统和利益道德规范体系。正面探讨了利益的终极道德本质,从整体上重新考察了利益伦理的基本道德原则,利益与劳动、价值、德行、 公正、政府道德和法律治理等重要而迫切的问题.

本书对马克思主义哲学的发展问题进行研究,作者致力于通过对马克思主义发展的某些概念、范畴和原理的反思和阐述,使读者洞悉马克思主义哲学过去、现在和未来的诸多方面。.

本书包括: 与命与仁: 原始儒家的伦理精神及其现代诠释、问题与观念: 现代性格义、原始儒家的天命—道德史观与现代性的时间、原始儒家的“为己之学”与现代性的自我问题、原始儒家的“天命在身”观念与现代性的政道问题.

Xunzi’s pessimistic understanding of human nature and his endorsement of the intrinsically valuable virtue of yi (義) put him in a vulnerable position. To defend this position, Xunzi needs to conquer what the essay calls “the compatibility problems,” the first of which concerns the compatibility between bad human nature and virtue, while the second is between Xunzi’s functional understanding of virtue and his understanding of virtue as possessing intrinsic value. If Xunzi’s moral philosophy were to fail to solve these two (...) problems, it would be guilty of inconsistency. In reconstructing a genealogy of Xunzi’s philosophy, I argue that he can successfully resolve the two compatibility problems, and his genealogy perspicuously shows that virtue can grow out of vicious human nature. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Nothing This article is about nothing. It is not the case that there is no thing that the article is about; nevertheless, the article does indeed explore the absence of referents as well as referring to absence. Nothing is said to have many extraordinary properties, but in predicating anything of nothingness we … Continue reading The Metaphysics of Nothing →.

本书是一本关于意识的自然科学研究的论著,提出了要用自然科学的观点和方法,考察了意识的实验资料,探讨了意识的本质及四个规律。.

Yablo suggests a ‘hostage crisis’ occurs when an unproblematic statement ϕ entails, and is therefore hostage to, a problematic statement ψ. Yablo proposes a technical solution to this kind of problem by diminishing ϕ to ϕ*, where ϕ* does not entail ψ and thus is not hostage to it. I argue that Yablo’s proposal is unnecessary because the original, undiminished ϕ does not in fact entail ψ. This is what Yablo calls a ‘defiant’ position. I defend defiance by arguing that (...) ϕ and ψ are of different metaphysical weights, which I show through an analysis of their use of quantification. (shrink)

This paper reflects on metametaphysics and as such develops a metametameta-physical view: that quietist metametaphysics requires dialetheism, and in turn a paraconsistent logic. I demonstrate this using Carnap’s metametaphysical position in his 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' as an example, with regard to how it exhibits self-reference and results in inconsistency. I show how applying Carnap’s position to itself produces a dilemma, both horns of which lead to a contradiction. Such inconsistency commonly arises from meta-theories with global scope, as the 'meta' (...) approach aims to transcend the scope of that which it is theorizing about, whilst the global nature will place itself back within the scope of that which it is theorizing about, which together result in the theory referring to itself whilst refuting itself. I argue that any global metametaphysical theory that draws a limit to thought will face self-reference problems leading to contradictory realms. My conclusion is conditional: If we want to meta-philosophize in such a way and treat quietist meta-theories as being true, then we need to be dialetheist and utilize a paraconsistent logic in order to accommodate the contradictions that result from such theorizing. (shrink)

This article is about nothing. Does that mean it is about something, namely, ‘nothing’? Or is there quite literally no thing that this article is about? Follow the dialogue between characters discussing the nature of non-existence and absences to find out! Along the way there will be tongue twisters, contradictions, paradoxes and riddles, ready to challenge our preconceptions of reality as we embark into the mysterious realm of nothingness.

Consider the following two metaphysical questions about pregnancy: (1) When does a new organism of a certain kind start to exist? (2) What is the mereological and topological relationship between the pregnant organism and with what it is pregnant? Despite assumptions made in the literature, I take these questions to be independent of each other, such that an answer to one does not provide an answer to the other. I argue that the way to connect them is via a maximality (...) principle that prevents one organism being a proper part of another organism of the same kind. That being said, such a maximality principle need not be held, and may not apply in the case of pregnancy. The aims of this paper are thus to distinguish and connect these metaphysical questions, in order to outline a taxonomy of rival mereotopological models of pregnancy that result from the various combinations of their answers. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Lewis’ ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’ . Lewis was in the business of defending Humean Supervenience, and the project seemed successful until the case of chance. Lewis thus originally named chance the ‘big bad bug’ for Humean Supervenience until the aforementioned paper in which he claims victory. Here I argue that he was unsuccessful and that Humean Supervenience remains bugged by chance. I will show how this bug remains due to a misdiagnosis of where the problem (...) lies with regard to undermining. First, I define Humean Supervenience and chance, and state the bug in its original form, then secondly I describe Lewis’ attempt to remove the bug. Thirdly, I explain why the bug persists, despite Lewis’ efforts, and show the real source of the undermining problem to be due to the circularity of Humean Supervenient style accounts of chance. Finally I describe the situation this leaves chance in, and show how the incompatibility of chance and Humean Supervenience is evidence for the nonexistence of chance. I conclude that it is the circularity of the formation of Humean Supervenient laws of chance which continue to bug Humean Supervenience, leaving it untenable and resulting in little chance for chance. (shrink)

I address the problem of whether philosophy can be international by its claim to represent rationality, hence universality. I argue in favor of this claim by focusing on the special logic thesis in Chinese philosophy. This thesis holds that a different type of logic must be used when studying the Chinese texts. I argue at length against the special logic thesis by examining the problem of human nature in the Confucian philosophers Mencius, Hsün Tzu and Kao Tzu. I show how (...) their arguments can be reconstructed as inductive analogical arguments and as deductive argument. I then broaden the notion of the logic of argumentation into a discussion of metaphysical anti‐essentialism and underdetermination in order to resolve the problem of human nature and also to show how the same types of logical analysis (more generally construed) can be applied to the arguments from these Confucian philosophers. Under my treatment, Kao Tzu, somewhat surprisingly, turns out to provide the most insight. (shrink)